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The British Foreign Office 
on the Situation of the Catholic Church 
in Yugoslavia, 1951-53* 
On 28 November 1951, Ivo Mallet, British ambassador to Belgrade (1951-1954),1 
sent a telegram to the Foreign Office about an article published in Borba, the offi-
cial daily paper of the Yugoslavian Communist Party (YCP). The article was the 
written version of the interview of the YCP Party Secretary, Josip Broz Tito with 
Drew Pearson, an American journalist. The Yugoslav Party Secretary answered 
one of the questions the following way: "Finally, I am in a position to tell you 
that, with or without Vatican consent, we shall settle the question of Stepinac,2 
within the next month at the latest, though it is obvious that he can no longer per-
form the functions of a high dignitary of the church inside our country."3 That 
was the first time that Tito directly indicated the release of the Croatian archbish-
op, who had been in prison since autumn 1946. Indeed, the archbishop was re-
leased on December 5,1951.4 The event seemed to indicate that the regime started 
a more liberal religious policy as opposed to the complete subjugation of the 
Christian faith and the Christian churches, which had characterized the line of 
* The research for this paper was written was in part supported by the Hungarian Schol-
arship Board Office Hungarian State Eötvös Scholarship and is based on archival re-
search that took place in the National Archives - Public Records Office, Kew Gardens, 
London between August-October 2007. 
1 Sir William Ivo Mallet, British ambassador to Yugoslavia between 1951 and 1954, and 
to Spain between 1954 and 1960. 
2 Alojzije Stepinac (1898-1960), archbishop of Zagreb, cardinal. He was appointed arch-
bishop in 1937. During World War II he pursued a controversial policy. Even if he did 
not condemn openly the ustase regime, he criticized the mass conversion of the Serbs to 
the Catholic faith. For the above-mentioned controversial role, he was sentenced to 16 
years of imprisonment in a show trial in 1946. He was released in 1951 to house arrest 
at his native village. His beatification in 1998 divided public opinion again. 
3 Foreign Office Papers, Political Files, The National Archives - Public Records Office, 
London, (henceforth: PRO FO) 371/95572 RY1781/79 . 
4 The archbishop was transferred to his native village, KraSnic, where he was put in 
charge of the local parish. 
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the official policy so far and was carried out in various ways.5 Still, only a little bit 
later than a year, on December 17,1952, Yugoslavia denounced the diplomatic re-
lations with the Vatican and re-started its anticlerical campaign with even more 
intensity. 
The aim of this article is to analyze the motives behind the above mentioned 
two steps of the Yugoslav government as it was seen by the British diplomatic 
corps in Belgrade in order to offer a clear picture on the situation of the Catholic 
Church, and therefore the Catholic faith in a country at the time when the prima-
ry interest of the Yugoslav communist leadership was to consolidate Western 
diplomatic relations after the escalation of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, which 
broke out in 1948.6 
The detention of Archbishop Stepinac seriously worried the Yugoslav leader-
ship because his captivity greatly complicated their relationship with the Vatican. 
Moreover, they had no interest in making a martyr of him. This can be indicated 
from the references the Yugoslav leaders made on his possible release, condition-
al upon his immediate leaving of the country. The Yugoslav deputy foreign min-
ister, AleS Bebler, also made this clear during his conversation with the papal leg-
ate, Monsignor Oddi on 2 June 1951, and the official Yugoslav news agency (Tan-
jug) communicated it on 5 July 1951.7 Another possible explanation for the arch-
bishop's release can be found in the main aim of the Yugoslav government, 
namely to create a Croatian national church, similarly to the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, which they considered easier to oversee and control, it being detached 
from the Vatican.8 In this bargaining, it was Stepinac himself who was the most 
important card in the hands of the Yugoslav leaders. 
The change in the Yugoslav opinion is interesting because even as late as the 
autumn of 1950, Tito, fearing the possible negative reaction of the Orthodox 
Serbs, who were disturbed by Stepinac's deeds during World War II, refused the 
5 The methods the Yugoslav Communist used against the churches varied systematical-
ly, from propaganda war through the imprisonment of the priesthood, attacks against 
church personnel and property to the suppression of religious education. 
6 For the relations between the Communist state and the different religions see: S. Alex-
ander, Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945. Cambridge-New York 1974, for the po-
sition of the Catholic church in Croatian and the relations between Yugoslavia and the 
Vatican see: M. Akmadza, "The Position of the Catholic Church in Croatia 1945-1970," 
Review of Croatian History 2:1 (2006), 89-115. 
7 TNA PRO FO 371/95571 RY1781/56 and PRO FO 371/95571 RY 1781/58. In his tele-
gram on 30 June, Peake mentioned that Tito had been ready to do that as early as in 
1946. Moreover, Vladimir Bakaric, Prime Minister and Party Secretary of Croatia, visit-
ed Stepinac in the Lepoglava prison in May 1947 and offered an amnesty to him if he 
left the country immediately. M. Akmadza-A. Vlaáic, "Vladimir Bakaric's Stance to-
wards the Catholic Church in Croatia 1945-1953," Review of Croatian History 3:1 (2008), 
167. 
s Ibid., 164-168. 
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release of the Croatian archbishop.9 On the other hand, as the under-secretary of 
the Holy See, Cardinal Tardini,10 set it forth to the British legate to the Holy See, 
Somers-Cocks on 15 February 1951, the most important aim of the Vatican was to 
guarantee free church services and teaching in religious spirit. Everything else, 
including the fortune of Stepinac, was of minor importance for them: "What the 
Catholic Church required was the right to carry out its apostolate, i. e. the right to 
preach and teach freely. Everything else was incidental, not only Church proper-
ty but even Archbishop Stepinac."11 Still, at least in public, the Vatican authorities 
emphasized that no change had occurred in their condemnation of the archbish-
op's trial. Moreover, they expressed that the Holy See respected and accepted 
Stepinac's opinion of being fully aware of his innocence: "Views of the Holy See 
regarding the trial and condemnation of Archbishop Stepinac are well known. It 
is obvious therefore that the Holy See would welcome the liberation of the Arch-
bishop. [The] Holy See learns, however, that Archbishop Stepinac, being con-
vinced of his innocence, prefers to remain near his flock. [The] Holy See cannot 
but respect these sentiments and consequently does not intend to impose a sepa-
ration which would be opposed to Mgr. Stepinac's conception of his duty."12 
Therefore, another factor in Yugoslav foreign policy must have played a crucial 
role in the archbishop's final release. Namely, in autumn 1950, a bill on the aid to 
Yugoslav economy came on the agenda of the Foreign Policy Committee of the 
Congress of the United States.13 The Yugoslavs feared that the bill, which aimed 
to help the disastrous Yugoslav economy, might be opposed by some religious 
members of the committee14 who demanded the immediate release of the arch-
bishop in exchange for supporting the bill. As for the British ambassador to Bel-
grade, Ivo Mallet traced it back to the above-mentioned proviso in his letter to the 
Foreign Office on 30 November 1951, written at the time when the archbishop 
was still in prison. In this letter, Mallet expressed his opinion that, on the one 
hand, Tito might have had enough of the continuous harassment of those mem-
9 On the other hand, in his telegram on 27 November 1950, Peake thought that Tito's 
opinion rather changed because he did not want to admit that he made political con-
cessions for the American economic aid. PRO FO 371/88352 RY1783/29 . 
10 Domenico Tardini (1888-1961) cardinal and politician. Pro-Secretary of State, for Ex-
traordinary and Ordinary affairs from 1952, Cardinal Secretary of State from 1958 to 
1961. 
11 PRO FO 371/ 95571 RY 1781/33. 
12 The extract was the official answer of the Holy See to the note of the Yugoslav Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and was made public in the 9-10 November 1950 issue of L'Osserva-
tore Romano. PRO FO 371/95572 RY 1781/62. 
13 The foreign economic aid was seriously needed in Yugoslavia because critical food 
shortage emerged as a result of the forced industrial policy of the regime and the 
drought. 
14 Among them Brien McMahon (1903-1952), Democrat member of the United States 
Senate from Connecticut between 1945 to 1952, the only Catholic member of the Senate 
that time. He met Tito in July 1951. For this see: PRO FO 371/95572 RY 1781/68. 
McMahon is famous for the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission, through 
his authorship of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (the McMahon Act). 
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bers of the Congress, who had visited him that year, on the other hand, the Yugo-
slav leader wanted to avoid the impression that he was forced to bow before a 
possible American political pressure.15 
Apart from the archbishop's fate, the British Foreign Office was equally inter-
ested in the situation of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia in general. Therefore, 
on 1 March 1952, Ivo Mallet prepared a long report dealing with the situation of 
the Catholic Church and the Catholic faith under Tito's regime. While the ambas-
sador observed and pointed out certain liberal tendencies in the economic and 
political life of the country, it did not escape his attention that, in case of religion, 
exactly the opposite was true. Therefore, he prepared a brief summary on the 
main events preceding and leading to the rather tense relationship between the 
Yugoslav state and the Catholic church in the country. Beginning in 1945, as Mal-
let emphasized, anticlerical propaganda was first mainly carried out in Slovenia. 
Moreover, the Communist regime was not against religious education at that 
time, neither intervened in the training of Catholic priests or the managing of 
church property. According to him, the modus vivendi was maintained even in 
1950, although this might also be influenced by the opinion of the American pub-
lic and its impact in the aid policy towards Yugoslavia. In Mallet's interpretation, 
the situation of the Catholic church worsened drastically in 1951, partly because 
the Yugoslav authorities initiated a trial against the Catholic seminar in Zagreb 
with the accusation of conspiracy against the state. The political impact of the tri-
al was rendered more serious by other incidents. For example, the bishop of Ma-
ribor was criticized in the local press on such unfounded charges that the pil-
grims cut out the red star from the Yugoslav flag during the procession at Ptuj on 
31 August that year. As a result, the bishop of Ljubljana was brutally beaten and 
the authorities turned the trial of the perpetrators into an anti-clerical mockery. In 
the ambassador's opinion, the incident clearly reflected the indifference of the au-
thorities towards such insults. According to Mallet, the Catholic church was at-
tacked on three fronts: children's education, priests' training and fund raising, the 
last of which had been sanctioned only in Bosnia Herzegovina so far.16 The am-
bassador also pointed out that although it was still possible to receive religious 
instruction in primary schools, it was only permitted through the Society of Cyril 
and Method in Slovenia. In Croatia, where such priest organizations did not exist 
that time, certain priests, loyal to the government, were authorized for such in-
struction, in about 20 per cent of the Croatian schools. Later, the Slovenian gov-
ernment, in a decree issued on 1 February, forbade religious instruction in 
schools altogether, which was followed by similar steps in Croatia and Bosnia 
Herzegovina. Those pupils who, infringing the prohibition, still learned religious 
instruction were failed at the exams at the end of the school year. Similar meth-
PRO FO 371/95572 RY1781/82 . 
1 6 The restrictions were easier to be carried out in Bosnia Herzegovina because of the 
ethnically mixed population, compared to the Catholic Slovenia or the dominantly 
Catholic Croatia where, except the Orthodox Serbs, the population was Roman Catho-
lic. 
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ods were used in trying to make the priests' training impossible. For example, the 
theological institutes in Ljubljana and Zagreb were shut by the authorities,17 who 
also tried to force the local priests into state organizations, similar to the trade un-
ions.18 
Therefore, according to Mallet, real changes took place during the autumn of 
1951, exactly when Stepinac's release was again put on the government agenda. 
In his opinion, one of the first signs of these changes was that the attacks against 
the Slovenian priests became more frequent. One of them was shot in October 
and others were so seriously beaten that they had to be taken to hospital. Moreo-
ver, the attacks against the ordinary priesthood were not limited to Slovenia but 
spread over to Croatia and the Dalmatian coast, where, until recently, the Catho-
lic church had enjoyed a "relative calm." The British ambassador also mentioned 
in his analysis that the propaganda attack against the Catholic church intensified 
in the Yugoslav press, too. For example, the leading Croatian daily, Vjestnik, ac-
cused the Vatican that it had supported the Croatian ustasa movement during 
World War II. According to the British ambassador, all of these measures indicat-
ed that the regime shifted the focus of accusations from the Catholic clergy to the 
Catholic faith itself.19 However, Mallet could only name a few possible reasons 
for this change of attitude. The decision could be influenced by the fact that the 
Yugoslav leadership identified the Catholic church with the Vatican's policy but 
he rejected this possibility. Instead, he tried to localize the reasons somewhere 
else and realized that the anti-religious campaign made it more difficult for the 
Yugoslavs to approach the Western powers. Therefore, he suggested that some 
internal development be the main reason for this political shift, namely, tensions 
among the members of the Yugoslav Communist leadership. As the Vatican's re-
action to the Yugoslav gesture of releasing Stepinac was rather cold, the moderate 
members of the party leadership might have thought that the Yugoslavs' conces-
sion was rather useless. Moreover, as far as Mallet understood, it became more 
and more difficult for Tito and the other members of the Yugoslav leadership to 
keep the left wing of the party, which accused the leaders of smearing the Marxist 
17 Before the closing down of the theology seminars, the buildings of the denominational 
schools were confiscated based on a law passed in 1945 prohibiting the maintenance of 
private education. The law also stated that the responsible ministry had jurisdiction 
over the authorization of theology education. This later was banned in 1947, although 
the boys' seminar in Zagreb was allowed to function until 1948. Akmadza-Vlaâic, 
"Vladimir Bakaric's Stance," 168. 
18 For example, the Cyril and Method Society in Slovenia, which gathered 39 per cent of 
the Slovenian priesthood. The similar organisation in Bosnia Herzegovina, for the 
above-mentioned reason, gathered 80 per cent of the Catholic priests in the republic. 
According to Mallet, a similar organization was planned in Croatia, too. PRO FO 371/ 
102668 WY 1783/2. In Croatia, the process started in 1947, first among the priests on 
the Istrian Peninsula. Akmadza-Vlaëic, "Vladimir Bakaric's Stance," 167. 
19 In his speech in the Politburo of the Croatian Communist Party on 24 August 1946, 
Vladimir Bakaric stated just the opposite of it: „One should attack the priests, not reli-
gion." Ibid., 162. 
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ideology while advancing towards the West, silent. Still, for Mallet, another pos-
sible reason could be rooted in Communist ideology itself because atheism made 
it impossible not to attack religion.20 
One may ask how the British public reacted to this facet of Yugoslav policy. It 
can be stated that the British public opinion showed great concern about the fate 
of Stepinac, and about the situation of religion in Yugoslavia in general. Private 
letters, copies of inquiring letters sent to the Members of Parliaments from their 
voters, proposals and memoranda of various Yugoslav organizations in exile 
reached the Foreign Office, sometimes on a daily basis and especially at the end 
of 1952 and early 1953, as Tito's visit to Great Britain drew closer. Still, the For-
eign Office always formulated a non-committal reply as the answer of the Par-
liamentary Secretary of State, Ernest Davies to a Member of Parliament on 1 Jan-
uary 1951 clearly illustrates: "His Majesty's Government have never sought to 
condone religious intolerance in any part of the world and are in favor of com-
plete freedom of religion. For your personal information His Majesty's Ambassa-
dor in Yugoslavia will continue to take any opportunity that may present itself to 
keep before the Yugoslav Government the fact that public opinion in this country 
is concerned with the instances to the contrary, such as the imprisonment of 
Archbishop Stepinac."21 But they did not wish to interfere in Yugoslav internal 
affairs. 
One may also ask whether such attacks were restricted to the Catholic church 
or a similar process characterized the relationship between the Yugoslav state 
and other religions. In Mallet's above mentioned analysis, the British ambassador 
dealt with the situation of the Orthodox church, the other large Christian faith in 
Yugoslavia and reported on similar unfavorable tendencies. The press carried out 
a propaganda campaign not only against the Catholics but also against the Or-
thodox believers; many Orthodox churches were looted during the previous 
years. Moreover, the leaders of the Orthodox theological faculty in Belgrade were 
informed in a threatening letter about their "being liquidated by 28 June."22 
The British ambassador to Belgrade prepared a more detailed analysis of the 
situation of the Orthodox church on 3 July 1952 in which he dealt with the annual 
meeting of the Council of Serbian Orthodox Bishops in particular and the Serbian 
Orthodox Church in general. In this report, the British ambassador emphasized 
that the Serbian church, as a result of its organization and history, was more vul-
nerable than the Catholics, who had a superior foreign authority (namely the Vat-
ican) above their national organizational structure. As the Serbian Orthodox 
Church was a national church in the real meaning of the world, it lacked that 
kind of protection, even if it was a member of the Orthodox World Council. 
Therefore, it was more exposed to the secular authorities. Moreover, its religious 
20 PRO FO 371/102668 WY1783 /2 . 
21 PRO FO 371/88352 RY1783/56. 
22 PRO FO 371/102268 WY 1783/2. 
2 0 8 
THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE ON THE SITUATION OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH . . . 
teaching practice was made nearly impossible after the World War,23 which could 
be impossible in case of the Catholics or the Muslims. The Communist authorities 
had aimed to form a direct control over the Orthodox church since their coming 
into power. As at first attempt, they formed the Alliance of Orthodox Priests, 
which, even if under duress, 80 per cent of the priesthood had joined. The fact 
that only a few people were willing to join the priesthood resulted to an acute 
problem, which was further intensified by the fact that only two priest seminars 
existed, one at Rakovica, in the neighborhood of Belgrade, the other at Prizren, in 
today southern Kosovo, housing and training about 3 hundred students when at 
least a thousand were necessary.24 Hundreds of churches were abandoned be-
cause the Church lacked the financial resources for their maintenance.25 
Another form of submission of the Orthodox Church to state power was the 
election of a new patriarch loyal to the state, Vikentije II, after the death of Gav-
rilo26 on 3 May 195027 as it was reported by the then British ambassador to Bel-
grade, Sir Charles Peake.28 Peake considered Vikentije a puppet because the new 
patriarch lacked a wide-span church career which would have qualified him for 
the new title on its own. Moreover, Josip, the metropolitan of Skoplje, head of the 
Holy Synod,29 was arrested on 24 June, shortly before the election of the new pa-
triarch took place. 
Although the grievances they suffered were similar, it would be premature to 
suppose a real rapprochement between the two Christian churches. Mallet came 
to a similar conclusion, too, and mentioned in his letter on 13 November 1952 that 
it would be impossible to leave 900 years of suspicion and distrust behind, espe-
23 During World War II, Serbian priesthood suffered serious loses. About a quarter or a 
fifth of its clergy died and six of its bishops were executed, three of them by the ustaSe. 
Nearly half of the churches and monasteries were demolished in the fights. S. P. 
Ramet, Balkan Babel. Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia. Boulder 1992,145-146, 
150-151. 
24 PRO FO 371/95573 RY1782/1 . 
25 PRO FO 371/102268 W Y 1 7 8 3 / 3 . 
26 Gavrilo Dozic (1881-1950), Serbian Orthodox Patriarch between 1938 and 1950. He was 
interned in the Dachau concentration camp because he had condemned Yugoslavia's 
signing of the Tripartite Act with Nazi Germany. He was freed in the summer of 1945 
and returned to Yugoslavia in 1946. 
27 Vikentije Prodanov (1890-1958), bishop of Zletovo and Strumica, Orthodox Patriarch 
from 1950. 
28 Sir Charles Brinsley Prembleton Peake (1897-1958), British ambassador to Yugoslavia 
between 1946 and 1951, then British ambassador to Greece. 
29 During the inaugural ceremony, the new patriarch received the venerations of the oth-
er prelates while sitting on the throne. Then, contrary to traditions, he stood up and 
shook hands with the state and party dignitaries present at the ceremony. Peake took it 
as a symbol of loyalty to the Communist leadership. PRO FO 371/88351 RY 1783/9. It 
is an interesting parallel that Josip was released from the Trstenik monastery where he 
was under house arrest on 29 November 1951, a few days earlier than Stepinac was 
transferred to his native village, probably in an effort to soothe the expected Serb op-
position to the release of the Croatian archbishop. PRO FO 371/95572 RY 1781/82. 
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cially because only 7 years had passed since World War II when these grievances 
manifested themselves in violent outleashes. The British ambassador reminded 
the Foreign Office that the Croatian Catholic church was still generally associated 
with Pavelic's Croatian ustase, just as the politics of the Vatican with Italian irre-
dentism towards Yugoslavia.30 
That is to say, the question of Trieste escalated again between Yugoslavia and 
Italy in 1952 and to make things more complicated, the Italian prime minister, Al-
cide de Gasperi31 adopted a more severe attitude as the parliamentary elections 
came closer. At the same time, as a result of the intensified Yugoslav-Turkish and 
Yugoslav-Greek rapprochement,32 Tito lost his interest in good neighbourly rela-
tions with Italy. Under these circumstances, it was highly unfortunate that the of-
ficial view of the Holy See, probably because of the Yugoslav attacks against the 
Catholic faith, stiffened. Moreover, the Pope promoted Stepinac to cardinal the 
same year, which was considered as an interference with the internal affairs of 
Yugoslavia by the authorities.33 The papal legate, Tardini changed his view, too, 
as it can be deduced from the dispatch of the British legate to the Holy See to the 
Foreign Office on 5 December 1952. According to the dispatch, Tardini made it 
clear that the position of the Vatican on Stepinac's case had remained firm and 
the only reason for its modification would be a general settlement between the 
Vatican and Yugoslavia: "Nevertheless, if it should be possible to reach a modus 
vivendi with the Yugoslav Government [...] Monsignor Tardini did not suppose 
that it would be impossible to solve the particular problem of Monsignor 
Stepinac."34 However, the British legate did not consider it feasible, especially be-
cause that "indeed might well compromise the whole position of the Catholic 
Church in Yugoslavia, as it has already been compromised in varying degrees in 
some other Communist controlled countries."35 The conflict of different interests 
resulted in Yugoslavia's denunciation of diplomatic relations with the Holy See 
on 17 December 1952 and it was restored only in 1970. 
The reasons leading to the denunciation were most aptly enumerated in the 
speech of the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edvard Kardelj36 in the For-
eign Affairs Committee of the Yugoslav federal parliament, the Skupsciria, on 18 
3 0 PRO FO 371/102268 W Y 1 7 8 3 / 8 . 
31 Alcide de Gasperi (1881-1954), Italian statesman and politician, founder of the Italian 
Christian Democratic Party. From 1945 to 1953 he was the prime minister of Italy. Be-
fore his death, he was the president of the European Parliament. 
32 The result of this rapprochement was a short lived military treaty, the so called Balkan 
Pact, which was signed in Ankara, Turkey, on 9 August 1954. 
33 Akmadza and VlaSic considers the establishment of priest organizations as the real 
cause of the Vatican's interference with the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. Akmadza-
VlaSic, "Vladimir Bakaric's Stance," 170. Mallet considered Stepinac's appointment as a 
good pretext. PRO FO 371/102266 WY 1781/30. 
34 PRO FO 371/102266 WY 1781/21. 
35 PRO FO 371/102266 WY 1781/21. 
36 Edvard Kardelj (1910-979), Slovenian born Communist politician, one of the main the-
oretician of self-management, minister of foreign affairs between 1948 and 1953. 
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December. His speech also gives a clear picture of his government's opinion con-
cerning religion in general. In his speech, Kardelj expressed his conviction that 
the foreign press campaign on the situation of the churches in Yugoslavia was in-
tensified because of Tito's upcoming visit to Great Britain in the following 
March.37 Moreover, Kardelj regarded religion as a social phenomenon, which was 
impossible to exterminate by persecution but that was otherwise uncharacteristic 
of the Yugoslav state. Kardelj again stated that "[a] modus vivendi with the Roman 
Catholic Church [wa]s still [...] quite possible. The main condition [wa]s that the 
Church should limit itself to religion. Individual priests need not be excluded 
from political activity, but only within the framework of the existing social forms. 
The Yugoslav Government does not demand that the Churches or individual 
priests should make propaganda for Communism, less socialism. It does not de-
mand that they should detach themselves from the Vatican but they must take 
a patriotic attitude" and he concluded his speech with a famous proverb: "and 
render to Ceasar the things that are Ceasar's."38 
Still, the circumstances gradually improved. A law on the legal situation of the 
Catholic Church was passed on 27 April 1953 and less retaliation against Chris-
tian believers took place. Real improvement started after Stepinac's death in 1960, 
which resulted in the signing of a protocol between the two parties in 1966. Final-
ly, diplomatic relations were restored in 1970 and Tito visited the Vatican in 
1971.39 
The aim of this article was to analyze how the British Foreign Office saw the 
situation of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia in general and the case of Arch-
bishop Stepinac in particular in the early 1950s. As it can be seen in the article, the 
Yugoslav Communist regime pursued its policy against the Catholic Church 
through various methods and with varied intensity. The already complex rela-
tionship between the Yugoslav government and the Catholic hierarchy was fur-
ther complicated among other things by the personal fate of Archbishop Stepinac, 
of whom the Yugoslavs refused to make a martyr; the bad economic situation of 
the country, which made Western economic help inevitable; the left wing of the 
Communist party, which opposed further rapprochement with the West; and 
such factors in foreign policy as the Italian general elections in 1952 or the Yugo-
slav-Greek and the Yugoslav-Turkish rapprochement; not to mention the change 
in the attitude of the official Vatican policy in Stepinac's case. All of these factors 
37 Tito's visit to Great Britain took place in March 1953, a few days after Stalin died. It 
was a return visit for Anthony Eden's visit to Yugoslavia the previous autumn. Reli-
gious demonstrations indeed took place during Tito's stay in England. For a detailed 
analysis of the visit and the British religious reaction to it see: K. Spehnjak. "losip Broz 
Tito's Visit to Great Britain in 1953," Review of Croatian History 1:1 (2005), 273-293. 
38 PRO FO 371/ 102266 WY1781 /32 . 
39 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 132-133. For the relations between the Yugoslav state and the 
Catholic Church after 1953 see: M. Akmadza, "Pregovori Svete stolice i lugoslavije i 
potpirivanje protokola iz 1966. godine," [Negotiations between the Vatican and Yugo-
slavia and the signing of the 1966 protocol] Casopis za suvremenu povijest 36:2 (2004), 
473-503. 
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resulted in the denunciation of diplomatic relations on 17 December 1952. It can 
also be deduced from the British reports, that contrary to the similar grievances, 
no real rapprochement took place between the Roman Catholic and the Orthodox 
churches, at least during the time frame of the analysis. It is also inferred from the 
British Foreign Office papers that the official British foreign policy did not want 
to intervene in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, although the British public opin-
ion was impressed by the religious grievances. 
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